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In addition to the important substantive 
changes to Canadian law brought about 
by Carter v Canada (AG), the decision is 
significant for its consideration of the doc-
trine of stare decisis. This article examines 
the circumstances under which Canadian 
courts, including courts lower in the relevant 
hierarchy, might be entitled to revisit other-
wise binding, higher court precedents and to 
depart from them. At least in constitutional 
cases, the Carter trial decision affirms that 
trial judges may reconsider rulings of higher 
courts where a new legal issue is raised or 
where there is a change in circumstances or 
evidence that “fundamentally shifts the par-
ameters of the debate.” Following a review 
of the recent Supreme Court of Canada case 
law on stare decisis, including Carter, the 
article turns to some critiques of the Court’s 
En plus des modifications importantes à la 
loi canadienne suscitées par l’arrêt Carter c 
Canada (PG), ce jugement est important en 
raison de son examen du principe du stare 
decisis. Le présent article analyse les cir-
constances en vertu desquelles les tribunaux 
canadiens, y compris les tribunaux moins 
élevés dans la hiérarchie pertinente, pour-
raient réexaminer et s’écarter de pré-
cédents autrement obligatoires rendus par 
les tribunaux supérieurs. Dans Carter, la 
cour d’instance affirme que les juges de 
première instance peuvent reconsidérer les 
décisions provenant de tribunaux supérieurs 
lorsqu’une nouvelle question de droit est 
soulevée ou lorsqu’une modification de la 
situation ou de la preuve « change radicale-
ment la donne », du moins dans les affaires 
constitutionnelles. À la suite de l’examen de 
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newly articulated approach to revisiting 
precedents in lower courts, and responds to 
those critiques. The article also looks to the 
recent case law in which courts largely re-
ject attempts to reconsider precedents from 
higher courts, revealing that the pull to fol-
low precedent remains strong in Canadian 
law.
décisions récentes de la Cour suprême du 
Canada concernant le principe du stare deci-
sis, y compris l’arrêt Carter, cet article traite 
de certaines critiques quant à l’approche de 
la Cour en ce qui concerne la révision de 
précédents par les tribunaux inférieurs, puis 
répond à ces critiques. Cet article examine 
également la jurisprudence récente dans 
laquelle les tribunaux rejettent largement les 
tentatives de réexamens de précédents prov-
enant de tribunaux supérieurs, révélant de 
ce fait que l’attrait de la règle du précédent 
demeure élevé en droit canadien. 
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introduction 
Carter v Canada (AG) (Carter SCC),1 is a case about life and death. 
The stakes for litigants do not get higher. The claim was filed in April 2011 
on behalf of Lee Carter and Hollis Johnson, a couple who had accompanied 
Lee’s 89-year-old mother, Kay Carter, to Switzerland to have a physician-
assisted death. Gloria Taylor, who was living with Amyotrophic Lateral 
Sclerosis (ALS), was added as a plaintiff shortly thereafter.2 The plaintiffs 
argued that the criminal offence of assisting suicide3 violated their rights 
under Sections 7 and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
(Charter).4 The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, rendered in March 
2015 in the plaintiffs’ favour and declaring the offence invalid insofar as it 
prohibited assistance to competent, consenting adults facing grievous, ir-
remediable and intolerable medical conditions,5 has been called “historic 
and far-reaching”6 in its impact. Other contributions to this special volume 
examine that impact and the many meanings of Carter SCC across law and 
society. This paper focuses its attention on the trial stage of the litigation, 
examining the lawyerly question of whether the trial judge was entitled to 
decide the case as she did, declaring the impugned law invalid, when con-
fronted with a precedent of the Supreme Court of Canada upholding that 
1 2015 SCC 5, [2015] 1 SCR 331 [Carter SCC].
2 The Supreme Court of Canada also heard from 25 intervenors who took various 
approaches to the issue (some strongly in favour of physician assisted death; 
some strongly opposed), including disability rights groups, religious groups, 
medical organizations, and many others.
3 Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 241 provides: “[e]very one who (a) coun-
sels a person to commit suicide, or (b) aids or abets a person to commit suicide, 
whether suicide ensues or not, is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years.”
4 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 
(UK), 1982, c 11. 
5 Carter SCC, supra note 1 at para 4: “[w]e conclude that the prohibition on 
physician-assisted dying is void insofar as it deprives a competent adult of such 
assistance where (1) the person affected clearly consents to the termination 
of life; and (2) the person has a grievous and irremediable medical condition 
(including an illness, disease or disability) that causes enduring suffering that 
is intolerable to the individual in the circumstances of his or her condition.”
6 Tonda MacCharles, “Supreme Court Strikes Down Assisted Suicide Ban”, The 
Toronto Star (6 February 2015).
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very same law in a Charter challenge twenty years earlier in Rodriguez v 
British Columbia (AG) (Rodriguez).7
I intend two meanings for the term “revisiting” in the title of this paper. 
First, the paper examines the circumstances under which Canadian courts, 
particularly courts lower in the relevant hierarchy, might be entitled to re-
visit otherwise binding, higher court precedents and to depart from them. 
In another sense, the paper revisits, in the light of the recent developments 
in the case law, what I said about stare decisis, and particularly the vertical 
convention of precedent, in my previous published work.8
As any first year law student can tell you, the doctrine of stare decisis 
means, at least, that courts lower in the relevant hierarchy are bound to 
apply the law as expounded by higher courts.9 Precedent was against Taylor 
and Carter, but they prevailed at trial. Justice Smith held that she was not 
bound by the decision in Rodriguez because the law and the legal analysis, 
particularly with respect to Section 7 of the Charter,10 had changed sig-
nificantly from Rodriguez. The social and legislative facts were also suf-
ficiently different, as exemplified by a substantial body of evidence from 
a number of jurisdictions that had decriminalized physician-assisted death 
and had subsequently studied the effectiveness of various safeguards in 
these jurisdictions to protect vulnerable community members from coercion 
or pressure to end their lives. 
While all of this was enough to convince Justice Smith to depart from 
Rodriguez, a majority of the British Columbia Court of Appeal did not share 
7 [1993] 3 SCR 519 at 615, 82 BCLR (2d) 273.
8 Debra Parkes, “Precedent Unbound: Contemporary Approaches to Precedent 
in Canada” (2007) 32 Man LJ 135. That article has been cited in a number of 
cases, but it is, in some respects, dated because it was written before the recent 
flurry of case law on the relationship between stare decisis and constitutional 
supremacy discussed below.
9 See generally, ibid at 136. This is the vertical convention of precedent (that 
courts lower in the hierarchy are bound by decisions of higher courts) whereas 
the horizontal convention relates to the treatment by appellate courts of their 
own decisions. 
10 Section 7 of the Charter, supra note 4, provides that “[e]veryone has the right 
to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof 
except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.”
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her view of the doctrine of stare decisis11 or its application to the case at bar.12 
They overturned her decision, citing recent decisions of the Saskatchewan 
Court of Appeal13 and Federal Court of Appeal,14 as well as my 2007 article,15 
for the proposition that “anticipatory overruling” of this kind is inappropri-
ate in Canadian law.16 They held that the “the trial judge was bound to find 
that the plaintiffs’ case had been authoritatively decided by Rodriguez.”17 In 
11 Carter v Canada (AG), 2013 BCCA 435 at paras 54, 58–59, 365 DLR (4th) 351 
[Carter BCCA].
12 Ibid at para 107
13 Saskatchewan v Saskatchewan Federation of Labour, 2013 SKCA 43 at paras 
48–50, 361 DLR (4th) 132 [Saskatchewan Federation of Labour SKCA]. This 
decision was later overturned by the Supreme Court of Canada: Saskatchewan 
Federation of Labour v Saskatchewan, 2015 SCC 4, [2015] 1 SCR 245 [Sas-
katchewan Federation of Labour SCC].
14 Air Canada Pilots’ Association v Kelly et al, 2012 FCA 209 at paras 47–48, 
[2013] 1 FCR 308, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 10711 (28 March 2013) 
[Kelly]. 
15 Carter BCCA, supra note 11 at para 316. It appears that I may have introduced 
the language of “anticipatory overruling” into the Canadian case law, since a 
search of all Canadian cases on both CanLII and Quicklaw/LexisNexis reveals 
only two that contain the phrase: Saskatchewan Federation of Labour SKCA, 
supra note 13 and Carter BCCA, supra note 11, both of which cited it in con-
junction with my article. In the piece, I described anticipatory overruling as 
occurring when a lower court is bound by a higher court precedent but refuses 
to follow it when the lower court “is firmly of the view that the higher court 
will overrule its own precedent when given the chance”: Parkes, supra note 8 
at para 17. My discussion relied heavily on a case comment by Dale Gibson 
in which he acknowledged the heretical nature of anticipatory overruling but 
argued that it could be applied in clear cases. See Dale Gibson, “Stare Decisis 
and the Action Per Quod Servitium Amisit – Refusing to Follow the Leader: R. 
v Buchinsky” (1980) 13 CCLT 309. I stated that, given the relatively relaxed 
approach to the horizontal convention of precedent evident in recent Canadian 
appellate case law, “it might be argued that the case for anticipatory overruling 
by intermediate courts is stronger than it might have been at the time Gibson 
wrote his case comment in 1980. However, the reality is that there are very few 
cases where it can truly be said that an overruling by the SCC is very likely or 
inevitable (as opposed to the CA simply disagreeing with the precedent of the 
SCC)”: Parkes, supra note 8 at para 22.
16 Carter BCCA, supra note 11 at para 316.
17 Ibid at para 324.  
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such a situation, they maintained, the trial judge’s role is to “allow the par-
ties to gather and present the evidence and to make the necessary findings of 
fact and of credibility, so as to establish the evidentiary record upon which 
the Supreme Court can decide whether to reconsider its earlier decision.”18 
Justice of Appeals Finch dissented for reasons similar to those of Justice 
Smith. 
The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the trial decision, confirming the 
approach to the vertical convention of precedent that the Court had articu-
lated in the intervening case of Canada (AG) v Bedford (Bedford).19 The 
unanimous Court in Carter SCC said: 
The doctrine that lower courts must follow the decisions of 
higher courts is fundamental to our legal system. It provides 
certainty while permitting orderly development of the law in 
incremental steps. However, stare decisis is not a straitjacket 
that condemns the law to stasis. Trial courts may reconsider 
settled rulings of higher courts in two situations: (1) where a 
new legal issue is raised; and (2) where there is a change in 
the circumstances or evidence that “fundamentally shifts the 
parameters of the debate.”20
The Court went on to apply this standard to Justice Smith’s decision, hold-
ing that “both conditions were met.”21 The Section 7 law was sufficiently 
different from Rodriguez, presenting a “new legal issue” for the trial judge. 
In addition, the evidence established new social and legislative facts that 
fundamentally altered the parameters of the debate, undermining key foun-
dations of Rodriguez, such as the premise that “a blanket prohibition” on 
assisted suicide “is necessary to protect against the slippery slope” toward 
vulnerable people being involuntarily euthanized.22
In a recent case comment on Carter SCC, Dwight Newman argues that 
the Supreme Court of Canada has abandoned an established rule against an-
18 Ibid at para 316, citing Kelly, supra note 14 at para 48.
19 2013 SCC 72 at para 42, [2013] 3 SCR 1101 [Bedford].
20 Carter SCC, supra note 1 at para 44 [footnotes omitted].
21 Ibid at para 45.
22 Ibid at para 47.
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ticipatory overruling without adequate explanation.23 He sees the Bedford/
Carter line of cases as displaying a “shockingly standardless approach to 
precedent.”24 He also argues that the Supreme Court has essentially col-
lapsed the two approaches to precedent (horizontal and vertical) into the 
same analysis. 
To examine the cogency of Newman’s critique and to gauge the scope 
and impact of the Bedford/Carter SCC approach to the vertical conven-
tion, it is necessary to look more closely at the way that the judicial role 
and process of judging is articulated in these decisions and to understand 
the contours of the contemporary Canadian doctrine of stare decisis within 
that context. Following a review of the recent Supreme Court of Canada 
case law on stare decisis, attention will be turned to some critiques of the 
approach to the vertical convention of precedent articulated in Bedford and 
Carter SCC, and responses to those critiques. The final Part of the paper 
looks to the future of the vertical convention, briefly examining a handful 
of post-Bedford/Carter SCC lower court decisions to get a sense of how 
the doctrine is being conceived of and applied. In short, the floodgates have 
not opened; the vertical convention of precedent remains quite strict.  The 
paper concludes with some brief thoughts on the theory versus practice of 
precedent.
i. the Practice of Precedent: recent suPreme court of canada 
case Law 
Recent cases before the Supreme Court of Canada have prompted the 
Court to explicitly address stare decisis and both the vertical and horizon-
tal conventions of precedent. Throughout its recent case law, the Court has 
cited familiar rhetoric about the pursuit of “certainty” in the common law, 
but has been more explicit about the extent to which it will abandon pre-
cedents (even relatively recent ones) in favour of correcting decisions now 
thought to be wrong in the light of new evidence or doctrine.  
What has been most significant in the last five years is the extent to 
which the Court has revised the vertical convention of precedent, allowing 
some limited room for lower courts to revisit otherwise binding precedents, 
23 Dwight Newman, “Judicial Method and Three Gaps in the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s Assisted Suicide Judgment in Carter” (2015) 78:2 Sask L Rev at 218. 
24 Ibid at 219.
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at least in constitutional cases. To understand this trend, it is necessary to 
read Bedford and Carter SCC together with the other key Supreme Court of 
Canada decisions explicitly addressing stare decisis in the last decade or so. 
This Part canvasses the decisions in roughly chronological order, drawing 
attention to the, at times, differing accounts of stare decisis and the way that 
the subject matter of the case may influence the practice of precedent. The 
opinions of Justice Rothstein are an interesting study in this regard. 
A word on terminology: my use of the term “practice of precedent” 
arises from my view that precedent is best understood as a judicial practice 
shaped by legal culture and a host of other factors rather than as a doctrine 
or rule.25 
A. R v Henry (2005)
I have previously traced the development of the functional and prag-
matic approach of the Supreme Court of Canada and intermediate appellate 
courts to the horizontal convention of precedent (their decisions to over-
rule their own precedents) in the early Charter era.26 R v Henry (Henry),27 
decided in 2005, ten years before Carter SCC, is regularly cited in recent 
cases for its articulation of the contemporary approach to stare decisis, par-
ticularly the horizontal convention.28 In Henry, the Court revisited two post-
25 See Adam Gearey, Wayne Morrison & Robert Jago, The Politics of the Com-
mon Law: Perspectives, Rights, Processes, Institutions (Abingdon: Routledge–
Cavendish, 2009) at 75–76:  
[P]recedent is not to be understood as a rule or doctrine but as 
judicial practice. That practice is shaped by, among other things, 
the rules on court hierarchy, ideas as to the nature of case law 
and the ‘law-making’ nature of judicial determination of dis-
putes. Such ideas reflect general jurisprudential beliefs, even if 
not so clearly articulated by the judge.
26 Parkes, supra note 8 at 149–58. 
27 2005 SCC 76, [2005] 3 SCR 609 [Henry].
28 I am grateful to Jula Hughes for reminding me of United States of America v 
Burns, 2001 SCC 7, [2001] 1 SCR 283 [Burns], a decision in which the Su-
preme Court of Canada reconsidered the constitutionality of extraditing Can-
adians to face the death penalty in another country just 10 years after it had 
upheld that practice under Charter review in Kindler v Canada (Minister of 
Justice), [1991] 2 SCR 779, [1991] SCJ No 63. In Burns, a differently consti-
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Charter precedents, R v Kuldip (Kuldip)29 and R v Mannion (Mannion),30 
interpreting the right against self-incrimination in Section 13 of the Charter, 
which together created confusion and a lack of clarity in this area of the 
law of evidence.31 In overruling aspects of those two precedents, the Court 
articulated a clear rule that Section 13 protects against any compelled state-
ments being used against a person in a subsequent proceeding,32 returning 
to the stated purpose of Section 13 articulated 20 years earlier in Dubois.33 
Any statements that were voluntarily given by the accused are not protected 
by Section 13 (such as, in Henry, the accused’s testimony at his first trial).
The Court in Henry stated that it “should be particularly careful before 
reversing a precedent where the effect is to diminish Charter protection.”34 
In the result, it overruled one aspect of the case law that has been beneficial 
to the accused (the rule from Mannion that an accused could not ordinarily 
be cross-examined on prior voluntary testimony) and one aspect that had 
been favourable to the Crown (the rule from Kuldip permitting cross-exam-
ination on all prior testimony, provided it was used to impeach credibility, 
rather than to incriminate the accused). 
tuted Court unanimously held that Section 7 of the Charter requires that the 
Minister of Justice seek assurances that the death penalty will not be sought 
before signing an extradition order, citing changes in the social science evi-
dence about the practice of the death penalty, particularly in the United States. 
Significantly, the Supreme Court in Burns did not overrule Kindler, opting in-
stead to distinguish it. In fact, the words stare decisis and precedent do not 
appear in the Burns opinion, yet the Court focuses on changes in the social and 
legislative facts surrounding the death penalty. See Richard Haigh, “A Kindler, 
Gentler Supreme Court? The Case of Burns and the Need for a Principled Ap-
proach to Overruling” (2001) 14 SCLR (2d) 139 at 157 (arguing that the Su-
preme Court lacks “a specialized theory to guide the overturning of previous 
constitutional decisions”).
29 [1990] 3 SCR 618, 1 CR (4th) 285.
30 [1986] 2 SCR 272, 31 DLR (4th) 712.
31 See e.g. Gary Trotter, “R. v. Henry: Self-Incrimination and Self-Reflection in 
the Supreme Court” (2006) 34 SCLR (2d) at 420, commenting on the pre-
Henry state of the law: “Twenty years of experience with section 13 of the 
Charter has given rise to inconsistency and dubious distinctions.”
32 Henry, supra note 27 at para 59.
33 Dubois v R, [1985] 2 SCR 350, 23 DLR (4th) 503.
34 Henry, supra note 27 at para 44. 
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The relatively transparent, pragmatic approach taken by the Henry 
Court to overruling its own precedents – admitting error or unworkability – 
is preferable to an approach that distinguishes cases on technical grounds, 
reinterprets them substantially without admitting a change, or continues to 
apply a law thought to be unjust.35 The Court offered three “compelling rea-
sons” for overruling its own precedents (the unworkability of former rules, 
unfairness to the accused, and inconsistency with the purpose of the Charter 
section), but generally seemed quite comfortable with its power to do so. 
B. R v Nedelcu (2012)
Skipping ahead a few years, the precedent set in Henry, overruling key 
aspects of the Court’s recent decisions in Mannion and Kuldip, was itself 
revisited in the 2012 decision in R v Nedelcu.36 The Court’s willingness 
to revisit Henry illustrates the diminished role that horizontal stare decisis 
plays in the Charter era. The Supreme Court, and lower courts across the 
country, are clearly wrestling with the many ways that the right against self-
incrimination can be interpreted and applied, and the implications of those 
different approaches for accused persons and the trial process. In Nedelcu, 
the driver of a motorcycle was charged with impaired driving and dangerous 
driving causing death after his co-worker died while riding as his passenger. 
When the deceased’s family also brought a civil action, Nedelcu testified on 
examination for discovery that he had no memory of the crash.  At his sub-
sequent criminal trial, Nedelcu provided a detailed account of the events.37 
The legal issue for the Supreme Court was whether Nedelcu’s Section 13 
Charter right prevented him from being cross-examined on his testimony 
at the examination for discovery. Criminal lawyers saw Henry as offering 
clarity and a workable rule (compelled evidence was protected and inadmis-
sible; voluntary evidence was not protected and therefore, admissible), as 
unpalatable as that may be in some cases.38 However, in Nedelcu, a majority 
of the Supreme Court resurrected the approach from the earlier case law 
35 Parkes, supra note 8 at 152.
36 2012 SCC 59, [2012] 3 SCR 311.
37 Ibid at paras 50–54.
38 See e.g. Megan Savard, “One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: The Supreme 
Court’s Decision in Nedelcu” Addario Law Group (4 January 2013), online: 
<www.addario.ca/one-step-forward-two-steps-back-the-supreme-courts-decis 
ion-in-nedelcu/>. 
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that had attempted, with great difficulty, to distinguish between incriminat-
ing and non-incriminating evidence. Nedelcu arguably returns us to lack of 
clarity, since a renewed focus on incriminating versus non-incriminating 
evidence as the threshold question creates considerable room for argument 
about the use to which a prior statement of the accused can be put.39 
In Nedelcu, the majority opinion framed the issue as an interpretation 
question (what does “incriminating” mean in Section 13?) and purported 
not to be overruling Henry. The dissenting judges were unconvinced, seeing 
the new interpretation of incriminating versus non-incriminating evidence 
as incompatible with the ruling in Henry. As such, Nedelcu is an example 
of the Court overruling a precedent in an indirect way. It is preferable for 
courts to be clear about their treatment of a precedent, reconsidering and 
overruling (if necessary) in a transparent way. No doubt the facts in Nedelcu 
– particularly the spectre of an undoubted liar being acquitted of a serious 
crime through the exclusion of his earlier evidence – loomed large in the 
decision to effectively overrule (or at least, substantially modify) Henry. 
C. Ontario (AG) v Fraser (2011)
Just a few months before Nedelcu, in Ontario (AG) v Fraser (Fraser),40 
the Court was similarly divided on this very issue of the approach it should 
take to overruling (or not) its recent Charter precedents. Fraser is one in a 
series of Charter cases dealing with the Court’s evolving interpretation of 
Section 2(d) freedom of association in the context of labour law. It is an area 
in which differing ideological approaches and views of the appropriate role 
of government in regulating labour-management relations loom large. It is 
also an area in which the courts have had to wrestle with the precedential 
value of early Charter decisions.
In Fraser, the Court rejected a claim by agricultural workers that the 
freedom of association protected in Section 2(d) of the Charter included a 
right to form a union which, if recognized, would render unconstitutional 
Ontario legislation setting out a regime for the legal protection of “agricul-
39 See Sara Hanson, “R v Nedelcu: The Right Against Self-Incrimination and 
the Return to the Unworkable Distinction” (24 November 2012), theCourt.ca 
(blog), online: <www.thecourt.ca/2012/11/24/r-v-nedelcu-the-right-against-
self-incrim ination-and-the-return-to-the-unworkable-distinction/> 
40 2011 SCC 20, [2011] 2 SCR 3 [Fraser].
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tural workers’ associations”41 that did not include protection for collective 
bargaining by these associations. The Court was faced with its own deci-
sion three years earlier in Health Services and Support – Facilities Sub-
sector Bargaining Association v British Columbia (British Columbia Health 
Services)42 which had recognized a right to bargain collectively in Section 
2(d), a decision which itself had revisited and overruled an earlier decision 
to the contrary from 1990.43 As it would also do in Nedelcu, the majority 
opinion chose to reinterpret (and indeed, limit) the scope of its recent rul-
ing in British Columbia Health Services. In so doing, the majority rejected 
the agricultural workers’ claim that the workers said flowed directly from 
the British Columbia Health Services ruling. While the separate legislative 
regime for agricultural workers’ associations was less favourable to work-
ers than the Labour Relations Act, 199544 in many respects, including for 
example, imposing no duty on employers to bargain with the workers’ as-
sociations, the majority held that the Section 2(d) right was not infringed.45 
Justice Rothstein wrote a lengthy opinion, concurring in the result but 
holding that it was necessary to overrule British Columbia Health Services 
which, in his view, had wrongly expanded the scope of Section 2(d), tipping 
the balance in favour of unions and workers. He framed his departure from 
the majority as a disagreement about stare decisis, making various argu-
ments in favour of overturning this very recent precedent, despite the fact 
that none of the parties had asked the Court to do so. Reading Justice Roth-
stein’s dissent, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that his fundamental 
difference with the majority was with respect to the correct interpretation 
of the right itself, more particularly, how strongly labour rights should be 
protected under the Charter and how much state regulation of the labour 
market the Charter should require, not about principles of stare decisis. The 
majority opinion upheld the three-year-old precedent of British Columbia 
Health Services, which declared the right to bargain collectively to be pro-
41 Agricultural Employees Protection Act, SO 2002, c 16.
42 2007 SCC 27, [2007] 2 SCR 391 [British Columbia Health Services].
43 Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada v Northwest Territories 
(Commissioner), [1990] 2 SCR 367, 72 DLR (4th) 1. 
44 SO 1995, c 1, Schedule A.
45 Fraser, supra note 40 at paras 106–07. For extensive analysis and critique of 
Fraser, and discussion of its impact on labour and constitutional law, see Fay 
Faraday, Judy Fudge & Eric Tucker, eds, Constitutional Labour Rights in Can-
ada: Farm Workers and the Fraser Case (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012).
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tected by Section 2(d) of the Charter, whereas Justice Rothstein urged the 
court to overturn this recent precedent in favour of the previous approach 
(in the 1989 Labour Trilogy) which had denied such protection. As we will 
see, a few years later, in another group of labour cases, Justice Rothstein 
takes the same substantive position – that the Labour Trilogy carved out the 
appropriate, limited role for Section 2(d) rights in the labour context – while 
again differing from the majority on whether to overrule a precedent.  
D. Canada v Craig (2012)
In Canada v Craig (Craig),46 decided just before Bedford, Justice Roth-
stein wrote an opinion for the Court which overruled its 35 year-old preced-
ent-setting decision, Moldowan v Canada (Moldowan),47 on the interpreta-
tion of a section of the Income Tax Act limiting deductible losses from farm 
income where farming was not the taxpayer’s primary source of income.48 
Moldowan had been criticized in a 2006 decision of the Federal Court of 
Appeal, Gunn v Canada (Gunn),49 and the trial judge in Craig had refused to 
apply Moldawan for the reasons articulated in Gunn. Tax law scholars Neil 
Brooks and Kim Brooks have extensively critiqued the decision in Craig, 
and the Court’s willingness to overrule an established precedent that was 
consistent with the government’s stated tax policy approach and that had 
been applied regularly by the Canada Revenue Agency for decades.50 On 
behalf of the Court, Justice Rothstein adopted what Brooks and Brooks de-
scribe as a “plain meaning” approach to the Income Tax Act, which they 
argue is strikingly different from the Court’s contextual and purposive ap-
proach in other areas of statutory interpretation.51 Brooks and Brooks point 
46 2012 SCC 43, [2012] 2 SCR 489 [Craig].
47 [1978] 1 SCR 480, 77 DLR (3d) 112.
48 RSC 1985, c 1 (5th Supp), s 31(1) as it appeared on 1 August 2012. At the time 
of Craig, supra note 46, the section provided that the loss a taxpayer could 
claim from farming would be restricted “where a taxpayer’s chief source of 
income for a taxation year is neither farming nor a combination of farming and 
some other source of income.” 
49 2006 FCA 281, [2007] 3 FCR 57.
50 “The Supreme Court’s 2012 Tax Cases: Formalism Trumps Pragmatism and 
Good Sense” (2014) 64 SCLR (2d) 267.
51 Ibid at 269–70. 
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to Craig as an example of “the staggering failure of the Court’s formalism” 
in tax cases.52 The horizontal stare decisis analysis in Craig consists of a 
loose balancing test, citing the familiar language of balancing certainty and 
correctness.53 At the same time, the Court’s analysis on this point arguably 
tilts significantly in the direction of “correcting” what the Court sees as an 
erroneous interpretation in Moldowan.
In overruling Moldowan, Justice Rothstein made clear his view that the 
vertical convention of precedent was strict here: the trial judge should have 
followed Moldawan, despite disagreeing with it and favouring the analysis 
in Gunn. He said:
It may be that Gunn departed from Moldowan because of the 
extensive criticism of Moldowan. Indeed, Dickson J. himself 
acknowledged that the section was “an awkwardly worded 
and intractable section and the source of much debate” (p. 
482). Further, that provision had not come before the Supreme 
Court for review in the three decades since Moldowan was 
decided.
But regardless of the explanation, what the court in this case 
ought to have done was to have written reasons as to why 
Moldowan was problematic, in the way that the reasons in 
Gunn did, rather than purporting to overrule it.54
In an interesting postscript, Parliament reacted swiftly to Craig by amend-
ing the Income Tax Act to return the law to the Moldawan interpretation 
limiting farm loss deductions.55 
52 Ibid at 273.
53 Craig, supra note 46 at para 27. The same language is used by Justice Roth-
stein in Fraser, supra note 40 at para 133.
54 Ibid at paras 20–21. 
55 Income Tax Act, supra note 48, s 31(1) as it appeared on 12 December 2013. The 
provision has since read that farming loss would be restricted “[if] a taxpayer’s 
chief source of income for a taxation year is neither farming nor a combination 
of farming and some other source of income that is a subordinate source of 
income for the taxpayer.” See Canada Revenue Agency, Federal Budget An-
nouncement, “Budget 2013 – Restricted Farm Losses” (15 July 2015), online: 
CRA <www.cra-arc.gc.ca/gncy/bdgt/2013/qa09-eng.html>; Economic Action 
Plan 2013 Act, No 2, SC 2013, c 40, s 14. 
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Brooks and Brooks argue that Justice Rothstein’s tax decisions con-
tinued a trend toward formalism found in the Court’s tax cases in the years 
before his appointment. During his decade-long term, Justice Rothstein was 
the top Court’s go-to judge in tax cases, writing a majority of the Court’s 
decisions in that field. The stated commitment to finding the “plain mean-
ing” of the tax statute, without an attempt to discern the policy purposes of 
particular tax provisions, “allows the Court to escape responsibility for the 
outcomes of its decisions. The results are thought to be preordained by the 
words the drafters chose.”56 There are parallels between this approach and 
appeals for a strict adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis in the sense that 
both can justify formalism over attention to the social context and impact 
of a decision. In Bedford, a changing social context loomed large, bringing 
with it a somewhat revised approach to the vertical convention of precedent. 
E. Canada (AG) v Bedford (2013)
Bedford is the watershed case, decided just a few months after Craig, 
that explicitly reassessed the contours of the vertical convention of pre-
cedent in constitutional cases. All members of the Court, including Justice 
Rothstein, signed on to this ground-breaking opinion striking down Can-
ada’s prostitution laws. In Bedford, the precedent was the 1990 decision of 
the Supreme Court in the Prostitution Reference,57 which had upheld the 
prostitution-related offences in the Criminal Code in the face of arguments 
that they violated Sections 2(b) and 7 of the Charter.  The 1990 reference 
opinion was framed around an economic liberty argument, as well as a com-
mercial expression claim.58 More than twenty years later, in Bedford, the 
legal arguments were substantially different. They focused on security of 
the person interests and recently developed principles of fundamental jus-
tice (arbitrariness, gross disproportionality, and overbreadth) as opposed to 
56 Brooks & Brooks, supra note 50 at 271.
57 Reference Re Sections 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code (Man), [1990] 
1 SCR 1123, 49 Man R (2d) 1 [Prostitution Reference]. As Adam Dodek has 
noted, references are, in practice, treated as binding authority in the same way 
as conventional cases, despite their formal status as advisory opinions: Adam 
Dodek, “Courting Constitutional Danger: Constitutional Conventions and the 
Legacy of the Patriation Reference” (2011) 54 SCLR (2d) 117 at 129–30, cit-
ing Peter W Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 
2007) (loose -leaf 2014 supplement) vol 1 at § 8.6(d).
58 Prostitution Reference, supra note 57, Part VI, paras 89, 112.
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vagueness and indirect criminalization which were argued in the Prostitu-
tion Reference. Also new in Bedford was a body of social science evidence, 
from which Justice Himel found new social and legislative facts, which 
were materially different from those on which the Prostitution Reference 
was decided.
Joseph Arvay, co-counsel to the plaintiffs in Carter, was also co-coun-
sel to the intervenor, the David Asper Centre for Constitutional Rights (As-
per Centre), in Bedford. Stare decisis was the only issue on which the Asper 
Centre intervened in Bedford and their submissions figured prominently in 
the Court’s decision on this issue. The essence of the argument made – and 
accepted by the court – was articulated in a 2012 law journal article penned 
by Arvay and his Carter co-counsel, Sheila Tucker and Alison Latimer.59 
They argued that “section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 effectively im-
poses a constitutional duty on a trial court to distinguish, where appropriate, 
a prior Charter decision on the basis of a change in legislative and social 
fact.”60 This approach to the vertical convention of precedent is rooted in 
the doctrine of constitutional supremacy. Here are the key paragraphs from 
Chief Justice McLachlin’s unanimous opinion in Bedford, approving of 
these arguments and articulating a limited exception to the vertical conven-
tion:
In my view, a trial judge can consider and decide arguments 
based on Charter provisions that were not raised in the earlier 
case; this constitutes a new legal issue. Similarly, the matter 
may be revisited if new legal issues are raised as a conse-
quence of significant developments in the law, or if there is a 
change in the circumstances or evidence that fundamentally 
shifts the parameters of the debate. 
The intervenor, the David Asper Centre for Constitutional 
Rights, argues that the common law principle of stare decisis 
is subordinate to the Constitution and cannot require a court to 
uphold a law which is unconstitutional. It submits that lower 
courts should not be limited to acting as “mere scribe[s]”, cre-
ating a record and findings without conducting a legal analysis
59 Joseph J Arvay, Sheila M Tucker & Alison M Latimer, “Stare Decisis and Con-
stitutional Supremacy: Will Our Charter Past Become an Obstacle to Our Char-
ter Future?” (2012) 58 SCLR (2d) 61.
60 Ibid at 74.
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I agree. As the David Asper Centre also noted, however, a 
lower court is not entitled to ignore binding precedent, and the 
threshold for revisiting a matter is not an easy one to reach. In 
my view, as discussed above, this threshold is met when a new 
legal issue is raised, or if there is a significant change in the 
circumstances or evidence. This balances the need for final-
ity and stability with the recognition that when an appropriate 
case arises for revisiting precedent, a lower court must be able 
to perform its full role.61
The Court in Bedford went on to apply this new standard to the trial deci-
sion, holding that the judge was entitled to revisit the Section 7 issue given 
the significant changes in the law and the very different basis of the Section 
7 argument in the Prostitution Reference.62 These legal issues “were not 
raised in the earlier case.”63 There was also a substantially different record 
before the trial judge in Bedford, including significant evidence indicating 
that the criminal prohibitions contributed to making sex work more danger-
ous, both with respect to the bawdy house and communicating offences.64 In 
affirming the trial judge’s jurisdiction to consider the Section 7 issue anew, 
the Supreme Court added that “the matter may be revisited if new legal 
issues are raised as a consequence of significant developments in the law, or 
if there is change in the circumstances or evidence that fundamentally shifts 
the parameters of the debate.”65 The Court went on to rule that the Section 
2(b) analysis had not changed substantially and therefore it was binding 
authority.
To be clear, the first way in which a lower court may revisit an earlier 
precedent – where “new legal issues are raised as a consequence of sig-
nificant developments in the law” – is not actually new; it is a grounded in 
61 Bedford, supra note 19 at paras 42–44, per McLachlin CJC for the court [foot-
notes omitted].
62 Ibid at para 45.
63 Ibid at para 42.
64 Bedford v Canada (AG), 2010 ONSC 4264 at para 365, 327 DLR (4th) 52. Jus-
tice Himel stated, “[a]s a result of the voluminous evidentiary record put before 
me in this case, I have found on a balance of probabilities that the impugned 
provisions materially contribute to the decreased personal security of the ap-
plicants.”
65 Bedford, supra note 19 at para 42. 
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the longstanding notion that an earlier precedent is only binding for what it 
actually decides. Of course, determining exactly what an earlier case stands 
for is a significant and somewhat indeterminate part of the analysis that 
leaves room for principled argument. The Supreme Court in Bedford held 
that the Section 7 issue before the trial judge had not been decided in the 
Prostitution Reference, whereas the Section 2(b) issue had.
What is truly new in Bedford is the statement by the Court that it is 
open to a trial judge to reconsider otherwise binding precedents when they 
are presented with a new body of evidence, particularly with respect to so-
cial and legislative facts, that “fundamentally shifts the parameters of the 
debate.”66 In this respect, the ten pages of the Asper Centre’s intervener fac-
tum loomed large. They argued for a threshold requirement of a “significant 
and material change” in the social and legislative facts for the revisiting of 
a precedent on constitutional grounds.67 They argued that this threshold will 
not open the floodgates: “[r]evisiting the few cases that meet [this threshold] 
will not throw the system into disorder or disrepute, will not threaten the 
rule of law and indeed will invigorate it by ensuring that citizens of ordinary 
means can hold governments to the highest law at the earliest opportunity.”68 
The unanimous Court agreed.
F. Carter v Canada (AG) (2015)
The new approach to the vertical convention of precedent was set out in 
Bedford, applied (with only the briefest of mention) in Saskatchewan Fed-
eration of Labour v Saskatchewan,69 and then explicitly affirmed in Carter 
SCC. By the time Carter reached the Supreme Court of Canada, most par-
ties and interveners proceeded on that basis that the Bedford approach, per-
mitting a limited revisiting of precedent by a trial judge, was now the law. 
As for the horizontal convention, it seems to have been widely accepted 
among the parties and interveners that it was time for the Court to revisit 
66 There is no mention in Bedford about the potential difference between a ref-
erence and a conventional case in the sense of the more fulsome evidentiary 
record that might be available in the latter. 
67 Bedford, supra note 19, Factum of the Intervener, David Asper Centre for Con-
stitutional Rights at para 30. 
68 Ibid.
69 Discussed below.
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Rodriguez in light of the new evidence and new Charter doctrine. That did 
not mean that Rodriguez would necessarily be overruled, but few doubted 
that the Supreme Court would take a good, hard look at it. The precedential 
force of Rodriguez, an early Charter case, had been called into question.
Only the Attorney General of Ontario addressed the vertical stare deci-
sis issue head-on, devoting its entire factum to this question and urging the 
Court to affirm a very strict approach to the vertical convention. The factum 
argues, “whether or not this Court now departs from its own prior decision 
in Rodriguez, the British Columbia courts had no power to do so. None 
of the factual or legal bases advanced by the trial judge justified the deci-
sion not to follow Rodriguez.”70 Ultimately, the unanimous Court in Carter 
SCC disagreed, affirming the Bedford approach to the vertical convention, 
at least in constitutional cases.
In an interesting move, the Ontario Attorney General attempted to flip 
the argument underlying the Bedford approach to vertical stare decisis in 
constitutional cases on its head, arguing that the doctrine of stare decisis is 
itself an unwritten constitutional principle.71 The Ontario Attorney General 
drew on the recent Reference Re Senate Reform72 in which the Court relied 
on the constitution’s “internal architecture” and “basic constitutional struc-
ture” to effectively constitutionalize certain aspects of the composition of 
the Supreme Court of Canada.73 The factum argued that “[v]ertical stare de-
cisis is reflected, albeit implicitly, in the provision in section 101 of the Con-
stitution Act, 1867 for ‘a General Court of Appeal for Canada’, the reference 
in the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867 to ‘a Constitution similar in 
Principle to that of the United Kingdom,’ and the preamble to the Charter, 
which acknowledges that Canada is founded upon principles that recognize 
the ‘rule of law.’”74 
These submissions, elevating the goal of certainty and predictability in 
the law to dizzying constitutional heights, received a very cool reception at 
the Supreme Court of Canada. In its unanimous opinion, the Court rejected 
70 Carter SCC, supra note 1, Factum of the Intervener, Attorney General of On-
tario at para 4 [Ontario AG factum in Carter SCC].
71 Ibid at para 7.
72 2014 SCC 32, [2014] 1 SCR 704.
73 Ibid at para 26.
74 Ontario AG factum in Carter SCC, supra note 70 at para 7.
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the argument outright. They note that “Ontario goes so far as to argue that 
‘vertical stare decisis’ is a constitutional principle that requires all lower 
courts to rigidly follow this Court’s Charter precedents unless and until this 
Court sets them aside.”75 In the next paragraph, the Court made it clear that 
stare decisis is not a “judicial straightjacket” and went on to approve of, and 
apply, the Bedford test for a lower court revisiting a precedent.
The Supreme Court of Canada does not engage the language of “an-
ticipatory overruling” in Bedford or Carter SCC. It is clear that they do not 
see this practice of revisiting precedent as overruling. The focus is not on 
the likelihood of a higher court changing its mind but, rather, what exactly 
is binding on the lower court due to changes in the law and/or evidence in 
the intervening years. The newly articulated Bedford/Carter SCC approach 
to the vertical convention is located in those decisions in proximity to the 
established practice of distinguishing a precedent as not binding on a new 
set of facts (here, new legislative and social facts) or as deciding a different 
point of law. Constitutional supremacy is the “hook” on which the Court’s 
approach to the vertical convention hangs. However, it is not clear in the 
Court’s reasoning (or, indeed, in the subsequent cases) that the revised ap-
proach to the vertical convention should apply only in constitutional cases. 
A substantial and material change in social and legislative facts may also 
fundamentally change the parameters of an issue in, for example, family 
law or tort law. 
Beyond applying the new test to the facts of Carter and concluding that 
it was clearly met by the changes in Section 7 doctrine and the very sub-
stantial changes in the social and legislative facts, the Court in Carter SCC 
provided limited guidance to lower courts in deciding whether a change in 
the law or evidence fundamentally changed the parameters of the debate. 
It did not, for example, suggest factors to consider in deciding whether the 
threshold for revisiting was met. In Bedford, the Asper Centre had suggested 
the following non-exhaustive list to assist in determining whether a change 
in social and legislative facts is significant and material: (1) the length of 
time that has passed since the earlier decision; (2) the breadth of the new 
evidence that was not available to the court in the earlier decision; (3) evi-
dence that the social, political, or economic assumptions underlying the ear-
lier decision are no longer valid; (4) evidence of a shift internationally in 
approaching the problem; (5) any difference in adjudicative facts between 
75 Carter SCC, supra note 1 at para 43.
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the two cases; and (6) and difference in the perspective of the claimants in 
the two cases.76
In Carter SCC, the Court clearly affirmed the Bedford approach to 
lower courts revisiting (constitutional) precedents of higher courts. It is sig-
nificant for its pointed rejection of the Ontario Attorney General’s attempts 
to shore up the vertical convention as strictly binding. Outside the consti-
tutional context, Craig suggests that the vertical convention remains strict. 
However, it is not entirely clear that the reasoning in Bedford (and later 
Carter SCC) does or should only apply to constitutional cases. 
G. The new labour trilogy: United Food and Commercial Workers, 
Local 503 v Wal-Mart (2014), Mounted Police Association of 
Canada v Canada (AG) (2015), and Saskatchewan Federation of 
Labour v Saskatchewan (2015)
During the approximately year and a half between Bedford and Carter 
SCC the Supreme Court decided three contentious cases about labour rights, 
all of which involved the Court revisiting its earlier precedents and address-
ing issues of stare decisis: United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 503 
v Wal-Mart Canada Corp (Wal-Mart) (allowing unionized Wal-Mart work-
ers to use a particular provision of the Québec Labour Code to challenge 
the store closure following certification);77 Mounted Police Association of 
Canada v Canada (AG) (Mounted Police) (holding that the right to bargain 
collectively requires that workplace associations be structurally independ-
ent from the employer);78 and Saskatchewan Federation of Labour (holding 
that Section 2(d) protects a right to strike).79 The latter case involved both 
the vertical and the horizontal convention; whereas the other two cases were 
solely about the horizontal convention.
In finding a constitutionally protected right to strike in Section 2(d), 
thereby overruling the Court’s decision in the 1987 Alberta Reference,80 the 
76 Ibid at para 34.
77 2014 SCC 45, [2014] 2 SCR 323 [Wal-Mart].
78 2015 SCC 1, [2015] 1 SCR 3 [Mounted Police]. 
79 Saskatchewan Federation of Labour SCC, supra note 13.
80 Reference Re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta), [1987] 1 SCR 313, 
38 DLR (4th) 161.
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majority opinion in Saskatchewan Federation of Labour, penned by Justice 
Abella, dealt with the stare decisis issue in one sentence:
Given the fundamental shift in the scope of s. 2(d) since the 
Alberta Reference was decided, the trial judge was entitled to 
depart from precedent and consider the issue in accordance 
with this Court’s revitalized interpretation of s. 2(d): Canada 
(Attorney General) v. Bedford.81
However, the dissenting justices addressed it at length, asserting that the 
majority was running roughshod over principles of stare decisis. Justice 
Rothstein co-wrote the dissent which echoed and expanded upon his dis-
senting opinions in Wal-Mart and Mounted Police. 
In Wal-Mart, the majority opinion held that section 59 of the Québec 
Labour Code, which bars the employer from changing conditions of em-
ployment during the period of negotiating a collective agreement, applied 
to the situation at bar, in which Wal-Mart had dismissed all employees 
and closed the business before a first contract could be negotiated. In their 
dissent, Justices Rothstein and Wagner said that the majority’s “approach 
undermines the principle of stare decisis, whose importance this Court so 
recently emphasized in Canada v Craig.”82 They took the view that an ear-
lier case, Plourde v Wal-Mart Canada Corp (Plourde),83 dealing with this 
very store closure but relying on a different section of the Labour Code, 
foreclosed the approach taken by the majority.84 However, section 59 was 
not before the Court in Plourde and the majority held that it was open to the 
arbitrator to apply that section as she had in this case.85 Justice Rothstein’s 
approach to stare decisis in Wal-Mart is a decidedly strict one.
In Mounted Police, a majority of the Court held that Section 2(d), guar-
anteeing freedom of association, which since British Columbia Health Ser-
vices has included a right to bargain collectively, entails a level of independ-
ence, and choice of bargaining unit and representative to be effective. In 
so holding, the majority overruled its 1999 decision in Delisle v Canada 
81 Saskatchewan Federation of Labour SCC, supra note 13 [footnotes omitted].
82 Wal-Mart, supra note 77 at para 122.
83 2009 SCC 54 at para 1, [2009] 3 SCR 465.
84 Ibid at paras 121–22.
85 Wal-Mart, supra note 77 at para 84.
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(Deputy AG),86 which had found no right to bargain collectively for Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police officers. Justice Rothstein, in a lone dissent in 
Mounted Police, framed his substantive disagreement with the majority in 
the language of stare decisis and certainty. He disagreed that the “structural 
independence” of workplace associations (unions) was a requirement of the 
right to bargain collectively, arguing that the majority approach “constitu-
tionalizes an adversarial model of labour relations and effectively excludes 
collaborative models.”87
Justice Rothstein sees this as an expansion of associational rights and as 
effectively reversing a key holding of British Columbia Health Services and 
Fraser, namely that Section 2(d) does not guarantee a particular model of 
collective bargaining nor a particular outcome of that process. He goes on to 
cite Bedford for the importance of certainty in the law. He says:
It is open to this Court to depart from its previous jurispru-
dence in some circumstances, but the importance and value of 
certainty demand that such departures be made infrequently 
and only where they have been carefully and explicitly con-
sidered to ensure that the departure is justified and that the 
implications of such a deviation from the normal rule of stare 
decisis have been fully and carefully analyzed. The majority 
has failed to do so and its departure from authoritative preced-
ents does not satisfy this high standard.88
In the Supreme Court’s most recent decision to address stare decisis, Sas-
katchewan Federation of Labour, a majority of the Court considered Bed-
ford and Carter to have clearly established that it was open to the trial judge 
to revisit the 1989 Alberta Reference which had held that there was no right 
to strike protected by Section 2(d) of the Charter. The interpretation of Sec-
tion 2(d) on which that decision was based – namely an “individual analogy” 
approach to Section 2(d) which had limited its application to activities done 
in a group that could be lawfully done individually – had been rejected 
in a series of decisions beginning with Dunmore in 2002, through British 
Columbia Health Services in 2007, Fraser in 2011, and Mounted Police in 
2014. Arguably, there is no other Charter right that has gone through such 
86 [1999] 2 SCR 989, 176 DLR (4th) 513.
87 Mounted Police, supra note 78 at para 211.
88 Ibid at para 212.
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a profound transformation as has the freedom of association.89 As Justice 
Abella notes for the majority in Saskatchewan Federation of Labour, there 
has been a “fundamental shift” in the interpretation of Section 2(d). The 
majority opinion in Mounted Police, penned by Chief Justice McLachlin 
and Justice Lebel had already described the shift as follows:
The jurisprudence on freedom of association under s. 2 (d) of 
the Charter. . . falls into two broad periods.  The first period 
is marked by a restrictive approach to freedom of association.  
The second period gradually adopts a generous and purposive 
approach to the guarantee.90
They go on to say that this “generous and purposive approach”91 seeks to 
protect “employee autonomy against the superior power of management”92 
to facilitate a meaningful process of collective bargaining. Justices Roth-
stein and Wagner dissent, disagreeing fundamentally with this shift and 
again framing their disagreement in relation to principles of stare decisis.  
Recall that previously, in Fraser,93 Justice Rothstein wrote a separ-
ate opinion from the majority, urging the Court to overturn its very recent 
precedent, British Columbia Health Services,94 which had established that 
Section 2(d) of the Charter protects a right of workers to bargain collect-
ively.95  Justice Rothstein also signed onto the unanimous majority opinions 
89 See generally Judy Fudge, “Freedom of Association” in Errol Mendes & Sté-
phane Beaulac, eds, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 5th ed (Mark-
ham, Ontario: LexisNexis, 2013) 527 (chronicling, as the author puts it at 528, 
“[t]he deep jurisprudential divisions amongst members of the Supreme Court 
of Canada over the interpretation of freedom of association in the labour rela-
tions context.”). For a thoughtful discussion of Justice LeBel’s contribution 
to these significant jurisprudential changes, see Jula Hughes, “Like Oil on 
Troubled Water: A Labour Perspective on the Charter Labour Juriprudence of 
Justice Louis LeBel” (2015) 70 SCLR (2d) 221.
90 Mounted Police, supra note 78 at para 30.
91 Ibid at paras 46–47, 77.
92 Ibid at para 82, cited with approval in Saskatchewan Federation of Labour 
SCC, supra note 13 at para 31, Abella J.
93 Fraser, supra note 40.
94 See Fraser, supra note 40 at paras 129–51, Rothstein J.
95 British Columbia Health Services, supra note 42. 
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in Bedford and Carter SCC, which explicitly take a more flexible approach 
to the vertical and horizontal conventions of stare decisis. His lengthy dis-
senting opinion in Saskatchewan Federation of Labour takes issue with the 
majority’s reasons for overruling the Alberta Reference, articulating again 
his deferential approach to judicial review in the labour relations context. If 
anything, there had been more judicial activity directly undermining the au-
thority of the precedent at issue in Saskatchewan Federation of Labour than 
there was in either Bedford or Carter SCC. It is clear from Justice Roth-
stein’s opinions in the intervening cases (Mounted Police and Wal-Mart) 
that he disagreed in substance with the majority opinion expanding workers’ 
rights. This is fundamentally a substantive, ideological disagreement, not a 
methodological one, particularly given Justice Rothstein’s agreement with 
the stare decisis analysis in Bedford and Carter SCC, but not with the ma-
jority in Saskatchewan Federation of Labour.
Tracing the Supreme Court of Canada’s contemporary approach to stare 
decisis doctrine through Justice Rothstein’s recent opinions tells us some-
thing about the malleability of the doctrine and the extent to which disputes 
about its operation are often fundamentally disputes about the merits of the 
substantive issues before the court. I do not point out these various appeals 
to, or descriptions of, stare decisis in Justice Rothstein’s rulings to single 
him out for criticism. Rather, I suggest that they illustrate the reality that 
stare decisis – and its alleged capacity to achieve certainty in the law – is 
simply one of the “working ingredients” of judicial decision-making.96 In 
all the cases, it was Justice Rothstein’s sense of justice, his view of the 
“correct” legal answer, that animated his decisions, rather than a particular 
approach to the doctrine of precedent. The extent to which he was prepared 
to depart from precedent or defend it depended on the substance of the pre-
cedent and, with respect, whether he agreed with it or not. Substantively, 
his labour opinions are all linked. Justice Rothstein’s position with respect 
to a restrained role for the state in regulating the labour market is consistent 
across all of these cases. 
A basic insight of legal realism is that judicial decisions are influenced 
by extra-legal considerations, including the experiences and beliefs of judg-
es.97 As I read the cases, Justice Rothstein’s approach to stare decisis is 
96 Parkes, supra note 8 at 161, citing Don Stuart, Canadian Criminal Law: A 
Treatise, 4th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2001) at 12.
97 Brian Leiter, “Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence” 
(1997) 76 Texas L Rev 267 at 278.
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not fundamentally different or more (or less) principled than that of other 
members of the Court. His substantive disagreement with Justice Abella’s 
majority opinion in Saskatcehwan Federation of Labour is about the gov-
ernment’s role in regulating labour relations. However, it is framed as a dif-
ferent approach to stare decisis.
ii. evaLuating the contemPorary JudiciaL Practice of Precedent
Critics of the Supreme Court’s contemporary approach to precedent, 
and particularly the new Bedford/Carter SCC approach to the vertical con-
vention, cite both principled and practical concerns. The principled concern 
is that voiced by Newman that the approach to precedent is “shockingly 
standardless” and the practical concern can be seen in the Attorney Gen-
eral of Ontario’s factum in Carter SCC, citing the need for a strict verti-
cal convention to prevent a deluge of claims seeking to revisit settled law. 
Similarly, the Ontario Court of Appeal in Bedford raised the spectre of the 
“living tree” doctrine of progressive constitutionalism being replaced with a 
“garden of annuals to be regularly uprooted.”98 
With respect to the objection based on a lack of standards and consistent 
judicial method, I have discussed above the extent to which particular jus-
tices’ stated doctrinal approach to stare decisis, and its application in a par-
ticular case, is very much influenced by the subject matter of the case and the 
judges’ own views about the correctness of the precedent. The stated goal of 
achieving certainty in the law through stare decisis thus promises too much. 
Justices Rothstein and Wagner open their dissent in Saskatchewan Fed-
eration of Labour with these words: “In our legal system, certainty in the 
law is achieved through the application of precedents”99 and that the judge’s 
task is one of “balanc[ing] certainty against correctness.”100 In fact, through-
out the case law and commentary on stare decisis, it is repeatedly stated 
that the doctrine balances the core principles of certainty and correctness. 
While this is an appealing formulation, the language of certainty promises 
98 Canada (AG) v Bedford, 2012 ONCA 186, 109 OR (3d) 1 at para 84 [Bedford 
ONCA].
99 Saskatchewan Federation of Labour SCC, supra note 13 at para 137.
100 Ibid at para 138.
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too much and is at odds with what judges actually do. Edmund Thomas,101 
a former justice of the New Zealand High Court, has argued that calls for 
strict adherence to precedent can actually undermine the elusive goal of 
certainty, noting that the doctrine can be manipulated politically102 and can 
compel courts “to distinguish on inadequate grounds decisions of which 
they disapprove.” He suggests a more pragmatic approach to judicial deci-
sion-making that sees certainty as a relevant consideration, rather than as a 
primary goal of adjudication.  He says this of certainty:
Those who pursue certainty as if it were a general, abstract 
goal of judicial adjudication do the law a disservice. Assume 
for a moment that complete certainty was achieved, individual 
justice would be sacrificed and, because it would be static, the 
law would cease to serve the needs and expectations of the 
community. The law would forfeit the concept of justice and 
abandon its social utility. Certainty is not therefore an ideal, as 
justice is an ideal. Nor is it a justification, as social utility is 
a justification. Rather, it is a concept designed to serve these 
ends. Its rationale lies in its ability to promote justice and to 
serve the needs and expectations of the community.103
It is clear that we have seen a difference in the articulated approach to stare 
decisis in recent years, a new orthodoxy. There is arguably a greater, more 
explicit emphasis on correctness over certainty. This is welcome, particular-
ly in the Charter era. An openness to revisiting early decisions is consistent 
with the rate of social change in the Charter era (think of changing attitudes 
toward same-sex relationships and marriage, for example). The fact that ap-
pellate judges may be more explicit about their interest in getting it “right” 
is commendable. Our appellate process contemplates, and indeed relies on, 
multiple minds being turned to challenging interpretive questions.104 
101 EW Thomas, The Judicial Process: Realism, Pragmatism, Practical Reason-
ing and Principles (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
102 Ibid at 133.
103 Thomas, supra note 101 at 136.
104 Occasionally appellate review does not occur in important cases, such as the 
recent, unusual Reference Re Section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada, 
2011 BCSC 1588, 28 BCLR (5th) 96, leading to the undesirable situation of a 
single judge’s views carrying the day on a controversial matter. 
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Similarly, the practical floodgates objection is not warranted.105 As 
further discussed below, since Bedford, parties in a handful of cases have 
attempted to revisit Charter precedents with little success. The spectre of 
lower courts refusing to follow precedents “every time a litigant came upon 
new evidence or a fresh perspective from which to view the problem”106 
has not materialized. This is not surprising. The practice of following 
precedent is deeply entrenched in Canadian common law culture and 
courts are fundamentally conservative institutions. The barriers to bring-
ing Charter claims are many, as evidenced by the recent treatment of a 
Charter challenge, Tanudjaja v Canada (AG) (Tanudjaja),107 to provin-
cial and federal action (and inaction) that the claimants argued exacer-
bated homelessness and inadequate housing in violation of Sections 7 
and 15. The claim in Tanudjaja was struck out at the pleadings stage and 
that decision was upheld by a majority of the Ontario Court of Appeal, 
with the Supreme Court of Canada recently denying leave to appeal.108 
While the approach to the vertical convention in Bedford and Carter 
SCC is a positive move for access to justice,109 the difficulties litigants face 
in seeking constitutional justice in the courts remain immense. The Supreme 
Court has demonstrated some awareness of this problem as, for example, 
access to justice issues figured prominently in the 2014 decision of the 
Supreme Court in Canada (AG) v Confédération des syndicats nationaux 
(Confédération 2014).110 In that case, Justices LeBel and Wagner wrote for 
the Court that the jurisdiction to strike an action on the basis of stare decisis 
should be exercised sparingly so as not to defeat access to justice:
Although the proper administration of justice requires that 
courts’ resources not be expended on actions that are bound to 
105 Arvay, Tucker & Latimer, supra note 59 at 80.
106 Bedford ONCA, supra note 98 at para 84.
107 2014 ONCA 852, 123 OR (3d) 161, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 57714 
(December 1 2014).
108 Ibid.
109 Some other recent decisions can also be seen as promoting access to justice. 
See Canada (AG) v Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United Against Violence 
Society, 2012 SCC 45, [2012] 2 SCR 524 (expanding the scope of public inter-
est standing); R v Conway, 2010 SCC 22, [2010] 1 SCR 765 (on administrative 
tribunals granting Charter remedies).
110 2014 SCC 49, [2014] 2 SCR 477.
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fail, the cardinal principle of access to justice requires that 
the power be used sparingly, where it is clear that an action 
has no reasonable chance of success.111
In Confédération 2014, the unanimous Supreme Court held that the 
unions’ claim was bound to fail; it had no reasonable chance of success 
given the decision of the Court involving the same parties, decided four 
years earlier.112 
Recently, the Newfoundland Court of Appeal had occasion to consider 
Confédération 2014 at length. In Andrews v Canada (AG),113 a majority of 
the Court allowed a claim to proceed in the face of a challenge that stare 
decisis and an earlier decision of that Court had rendered it “bound to 
fail” as in Confédération 2014: “the policy of husbanding scarce resour-
ces for true matters of dispute may have to give way in some cases to the 
importance of providing access to justice to enable advocacy of change 
in and refinement of the law.”114 The majority applied the Bedford test for 
revisiting a legal issue to modify the test for striking out a claim, holding 
that “a litigant may have a ‘reasonable chance of success’ within the test 
if based on reasonable argument there is a reasonable possibility that the 
law might change.”115 
111 Ibid at para 1.
112 Confédération des syndicats nationaux v Canada (AG), 2008 SCC 68, [2008] 
3 SCR 511. Both the 2008 and 2014 decisions involved the union challen-
ging provisions of the federal employment insurance regime as constitution-
ally invalid. For critical commentary on the decisions, see Mary Thibodeau, 
“Balancing the Budget with EI Premiums? Stare Decisis and Canada v Con-
fédération des syndicats nationaux” (19 December 2014), theCourt.ca (blog), 
online: <http://www.thecourt.ca/2014/12/balancing-the-budget-with-ei-pre 
miums-stare-decisis-and-canada-v-confederation-des-syndicats-natio naux/>. 
113 2014 NLCA 32, 376 DLR (4th) 719.
114 Ibid at para 18.
115 Ibid at para 19. Justice Welsh dissented, stating that “[a]pplying stare decisis 
as discussed in Confédération des syndicats nationaux, the conclusion follows 
that the decision in Bert Andrews resolves the entire dispute and provides a 
complete, certain and final answer to the fishers’ claim in this case” (ibid at 
para 81).
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iii. the future of the verticaL convention? 
A number of cases have addressed the vertical convention of precedent 
explicitly in the year and a half that has passed since the Supreme Court of 
Canada released its decision in Carter, setting out the parameters for revisit-
ing a higher court precedent in the light of changed law or evidence. Have 
the floodgates opened to regularly revisiting settled precedents in the lower 
courts? In a word, no. Courts have continued to apply precedents every 
day and, even when faced with an opportunity to revisit, they have often 
rebuffed that approach. The appeal of stare decisis remains strong in the 
Canadian common law world.
How are courts interpreting and applying the Bedford/Carter SCC test? 
That test provides that “[t]rial courts may reconsider settled rulings of high-
er courts in two situations: (1) where a new legal issue is raised; and (2) 
where there is a change in the circumstances or evidence that ‘fundamen-
tally shifts the parameters of the debate.’”116 A common refrain in decisions 
where the application to revisit a higher court precedent has been rejected, 
is the statement from the Court in Bedford that “a lower court is not entitled 
to ignore binding precedent, and the threshold for revisiting a matter is not 
an easy one to reach.”117
One such case is R v Hersi,118 in which a trial judge rejected the ac-
cused’s challenge of the constitutionality of section 577 of the Criminal 
Code, which authorizes direct indictment. The constitutionality of this pro-
vision had previously been upheld by the Ontario Court of Appeal in R v 
Arviv119 and R v Ertel,120 as well as by the Supreme Court of Canada in 
R v SJL.121 The trial judge acknowledged the new approach articulated in 
Bedford, suggesting it was “akin to the pronouncement of Professor Roscoe 
Pound more than ninety years ago” that “law must be stable and yet it can-
116 Carter SCC, supra note 1 at para 44.
117 Bedford, supra note 19 at para 44. 
118 2014 ONSC 1211, [2014] OJ No 3581 [Hersi].
119 51 OR (2d) 551, [1985] OJ No 2602.
120 20 OAC 257, [1987] OJ No 516.
121 2009 SCC 14, [2009] 1 SCR 426.
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not stand still.”122 However, the judge found no new legal issues or evi-
dence, easily rejecting the argument for revisiting the earlier cases. 
Similarly, in United States of America v Fraser (USA v Fraser),123 a 
judge of the British Columbia Supreme Court presiding in an extradition 
matter saw no basis for reconsidering the twenty-year-old Supreme Court 
of Canada precedent in United States of America v Lépine124 which had been 
codified in the form of section 5 of the Extradition Act to authorize extradi-
tion “whether or not the conduct on which the extradition partner bases its 
request occurred in the territory over which it has jurisdiction; and wheth-
er or not Canada could exercise jurisdiction in similar circumstances.”125 
Lépine held that the extradition judge should not consider the question of 
the requesting state’s jurisdiction to prosecute the offence in question since 
that matter was within the exclusive domain of the Minister.126 The judge 
in USA v Fraser was not persuaded by the applicants’ argument that an 
intervening case, United States of America v Ferras,127 had introduced a 
new legal issue that met the Bedford standard for reconsideration.128 In USA 
v Fraser, the judge rejected the characterization of the new issue as “the ar-
ticulation that meaningful judicial process [in extradition matters] is a prin-
ciple of fundamental justice under section 7 of the Charter,”129 saying that 
the only new aspect raised in Ferras was the approach to admissibility and 
sufficiency of evidence by extradition judges, a very different issue from the 
one being challenged by the applicants. Ferras was “not a broad overhaul of 
the law of extradition,”130 and, as such, Bedford did not authorize a revisit-
ing. To hold that Ferras reopened the question decided by Lépine would, 
according to the court in USA v Fraser, potentially call into question all of 
122 Hersi, supra note 118 at para 13, citing Roscoe Pound, Interpretations of Legal 
History (New York: Macmillan, 1923) at 1.
123 United States of America v Fraser, 2014 BCSC 1641, 116 WCB (2d) 277 [USA 
v Fraser].
124 [1994] 1 SCR 286, 111 DLR (4th) 31 [Lépine cited to SCR].
125 SC 1999, c 18, s 5.
126 Lépine, supra note 124 at 301.
127 2006 SCC 33, [2006] 2 SCR 77 [Ferras]. 
128 USA v Fraser, supra note 123 at paras 64–75.
129 Ibid at para 60.
130 Ibid at para 64.
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the Supreme Court’s many decisions bearing on the limited jurisdiction of 
extradition judges. “The values of certainty and stability that underlie the 
principle of stare decisis strongly militate against that result.”131
In R v Junek,132 a judge of the Alberta Provincial Court rejected Junek’s 
claim that his Section 10(b) Charter right to counsel was violated when he 
was not told that if he had a cellular phone with access to the internet he 
had the right to use the phone to access the internet as part of his exercise of 
those rights. The same judge had made such a finding in a previous decision, 
R v Welty.133 However, the very next day, a justice of the Queen’s Bench 
ruled in R v McKay134 that there is no implementational duty on the police 
to provide internet access to detainees who may wish to exercise their Sec-
tion 10(b) rights to contact legal counsel (although he suggested that police 
practice would likely change in the future in this regard) and therefore the 
informational duty was not expanded to require the police to tell detainees 
about their rights to access the internet to contact legal counsel. The judge in 
Junek concluded that the Bedford standard was not met. There was no new 
legal issue or new facts or evidence that significantly altered the parameters 
of the debate. He was bound to follow McKay.
In another reported case, R v Wagner,135 an individual charged with 
breach of probation and mischief to property in relation to her actions in 
protesting at an abortion clinic. She attempted to raise a number of defences 
– defence of the person, necessity, etc. – which had been rejected in earlier 
case law. The question of whether a foetus was a human being was also 
settled law. The Ontario Superior Court found no basis for invoking the 
Bedford rule concerning the vertical convention of precedent. The judge 
held that “the proposed evidence filed on Ms. Wagner’s part falls far, far 
short of, ‘fundamentally [shifting] the parameters of the debate,’ and there 
was no demonstration of any new legal issue.”136
131 Ibid at para 75.
132 2014 ABPC 199, 596 AR 397.
133 2014 ABPC 26, 582 AR 103.
134 2014 ABQB 70 at para 64, 100 Alta LR (5th) 1.
135 2015 ONCJ 66, 119 WCB (2d) 605.
136 Ibid at para 76.
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In R v Caron,137 the Alberta Court of Appeal unanimously dismissed a 
claim that there was a constitutional obligation for all Alberta legislation 
to be published in both French and English. Members of the francophone 
community in Alberta had successfully argued in provincial court that the 
provisions of the Traffic Safety Act138 under which they were charged were 
invalid because Alberta was constitutionally required to publish its legisla-
tion in both English and French. They were successful in the Provincial 
Court but lost in the Queen’s Bench and Court of Appeal. A majority of the 
Court of Appeal considered the claim on its merits while one member of 
the Court wrote lengthy concurring reasons holding that a 1988 decision 
of the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Mercure,139 was binding authority 
for the proposition that there was no constitutional requirement for English 
and French publication that came with Saskatchewan and Alberta’s joining 
confederation. Concurring in the result, Justice Slatter delved deeply into 
the stare decisis issue, opining that “stability and predictability are particu-
larly important” in the context of the “controversial and divisive” matter of 
constitutional language rights.140 He held that the Bedford standard of “new 
legal issues raised as a consequence of significant developments in the law” 
was not met141 and therefore, the trial judge should not have revisited it.142 
Similarly, he was unconvinced that the more substantial historical record 
constituted new “evidence that fundamentally shifts that parameters of the 
debate.”143 Interestingly, in the Court of Appeal the Crown did not rely on 
the stare decisis argument, focusing instead on the substance of the constitu-
tional arguments.144 The stare decisis opinion was a minority one in Mercure 
but it taps into a more traditional, formalist view of stare decisis, stating that 
the Bedford approach “embraces to some degree the controversial doctrine 
of lower courts ‘underruling’ decisions of higher courts.”145
137 2014 ABCA 71, 92 Alta LR (5th) 306 [Caron].
138 RSA 2000, c T-6.
139 [1998] 1 SCR 234, 48 DLR (4th) 1.
140 Caron, supra note 137 at para 91.
141 Ibid at para 79.
142 Ibid at para 79.
143 Ibid at paras 77–88.
144 Ibid at para 68. 
145 Ibid at para 70.
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Again in R v Caswell,146 the Alberta Court of Appeal is the site of a 
significant debate about stare decisis. Justice Veldhuis, in dissent, held that 
Court of Appeal should reconsider its 20-year-old precedent, R v Mitchell,147 
which had upheld under Section 1 the suspension of Section 10(b) rights at 
the roadside for sobriety tests and the use of an approved screening device. 
Since Mitchell followed the approach taken by the Supreme Court of Can-
ada in R v Thomsen,148 the vertical convention of precedent was also impli-
cated in this decision. In concluding that it was appropriate to reconsider 
Mitchell, Justice Veldhuis cited the Bedford language of changes in the law 
and circumstance that “fundamentally shif[t] the paramaters of the debate,” 
noting changes in technology (particularly cell phone technology) and in 
the legislative scheme (including immediate roadside suspensions).149 How-
ever, the majority did not agree and their opinion expresses concern about 
the approach to the vertical convention taken in Bedford. Justice Brown 
states, “[t]here is little doubt that … Bedford represents a significant new 
exception to stare decisis”150 and describes the Bedford threshold as “highly 
abstract – particularly when compared to the test for invoking the per in-
curiam exception.”151 Justice Brown, who has subsequently been appoint-
ed to the Supreme Court of Canada, articulates the view in Caswell that 
Bedford has not provided a “coherent and consistent normative account” of 
when a precedent can be revisited and that, therefore, “the best lower courts 
can do is take Bedford’s stated threshold seriously by applying it strictly.”152 
He goes on to do so, finding that changes in technology and the legislative 
scheme did not meet that high standard. It will be interesting to see how Jus-
tice Brown approaches stare decisis questions at the Supreme Court, given 
his criticism of the Bedford standard in Caswell.
In R v Fitts,153 Justice David Pacciocco of the Ontario Court of Justice 
ruled on a defence application for disclosure of certain information about 
146 2015 ABCA 97, 28 Alta LR (6th) 86 [Caswell].
147 1994 ABCA 369, 162 AR 109.
148 [1988] 1 SCR 640, 40 CCC (3d) 411.
149 Caswell, supra note 146 at para 15.
150 Ibid at para 36.
151 Ibid at para 40.
152 Ibid at para 40, citing Slatter JA in Caron, supra note 137 at para 70.
153 2015 ONCJ 262, [2015] OJ No 2431 [Fitts].
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the breathalyzer instrument used to obtain an alcohol breath sample relied 
on by the Crown. Justice Pacciocco was faced with evidence that cast doubt 
on the assumption inherent in a Supreme Court of Canada precedent, R v 
St-Onge Lamoureux,154 in which it was held that improper maintenance and 
historical difficulties with a breathalyzer machine can raise a reasonable 
doubt about the validity of individual test results. However, he held that 
he was nevertheless bound to follow St-Onge Lamoureux. Citing Bedford, 
Carter and other cases, Justice Pacciocco stated,
I am uncertain whether there is a change in the circumstances 
or evidence that “fundamentally shifts the parameters of the 
debate.” I can have no confidence that the Supreme Court of 
Canada did not have evidence before it similar to that which 
has been presented before me, and that it did not reject the 
arguments before it that I accept here. Nor can I be confident 
that the evidence that I heard is complete.155
In none of these cases did the judge find the Bedford/Carter SCC threshold 
for revisiting a precedent to be met. At least one expressed concern about 
a lack of guidance provided to the lower courts in applying this new ap-
proach to precedent.156 Obviously, these are early days and it may be that we 
will see more judges applying the Bedford/Carter SCC standard to revisit 
precedents in the future. However, it is unsurprising that the “garden of up-
rooted annuals” has not materialized.
concLusion: Stare deCiSiS – not Quite what it cLaims to Be
In a recent review of Neil Duxbury’s book, The Nature and Authority of 
Precedent,157 Stephen Waddams cites Duxbury’s view that “the doctrine of 
precedent has been an essential and beneficial part of the common law – but 
paradoxically, that it has served the common law best by not being in prac-
tice quite what it claims to be in theory.”158 According to Duxbury,
154 2012 SCC 57, [2012] 3 SCR 187.
155 Fitts, supra note 153 at para 71.
156 Caswell, supra note 146.
157 Neil Duxbury, The Nature and Authority of Precedent (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008). 
158 Stephen Waddams, “Authority, Precedent, and Principle” (2009) 59 UTLJ 127 
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[t]he value of the doctrine of precedent rests not in its capacity 
to commit decision-makers to a course of action but in its cap-
acity simultaneously to create constraint and allow a degree of 
discretion. A theory capable of demonstrating that judges can 
never justifiably refuse to follow precedent would support a 
doctrine of stare decisis ill-suited to the common law. For the 
common law requires not an unassailable but a strong rebut-
table presumption that earlier decisions be followed.159
Most commentators would agree that Canadian appellate courts have treated 
the horizontal convention in this way for some time. Some would argue that 
the presumption is not even that strong with respect to the horizontal con-
vention in the Supreme Court of Canada. Certainly the vertical convention 
remains stronger, even in the wake of the Bedford/Carter SCC approach 
authorizing lower courts to revisit precedents in limited circumstances. It 
is true that the judicial practice of stare decisis is not quite what the doc-
trine claims to be. However, this awareness should not be cause for alarm 
or pining for a strict convention that invites formalism. The contempor-
ary Canadian judicial practice of precedent is characterized by considerable 
constraint while allowing a degree of discretion to respond to changing legal 
norms or social context. In a case such as Carter SCC, that discretion can 
(and did) make all the difference. 
at 132.
159 Duxbury, supra note 157 at 183. 
